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International institutions have acquired an almost obvious presence in inter-
national politics and the question of their design has received prominent attention
in recent years. Apart from key organizational characteristics like size of their mem-
bership, policy scope, depth of cooperation, decision-making rules, and their degree
of openness towards non-state actors, one of their most striking features is their dif-
fering degree of legalization or judicialization (Goldstein and Martin, 2000; Zangl,
2008). Some institutions possess strong enforcement mechanisms or rules, while
others rely on voluntary cooperation by their members.
The policy ﬁeld in which the evolution towards greater institutional capacity to
enforce commonly agreed upon rules has been the most prominent and has pro-
duced the most relevant and far-reaching consequences has been the issue area of
multilateral trade. Since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established
in 1995, the multilateral trade regime has evolved from a typical case of intergo-
vernmental international cooperation where states retain near-full control over
decisions to an institution where enforcement powers are partially delegated to
third party bodies. During the preceding half century, dating back to the entry
into force of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, the reci-
procal concessions in multilateral trade rounds was the cornerstone of the multilat-
eral trade regime. In the current international trade regime under the WTO,
however, reciprocal trade negotiations are not the only means through which
WTO members can deal with the existing barriers to trade among them. With
the creation of the WTO, members decided to strengthen the existing mechanisms
for the enforcement of commonly agreed-upon rules, replacing the GATT’s model
of political-diplomatic dispute settlement with a quasi-judicial model of dispute
settlement characterized by automatic right to review, the formulation of legally
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binding obligations, a standing tribunal of justices, and the authority to authorize
sanctions and even cross-retaliation against recalcitrant members (Goldstein et al.,
2000; Stone Sweet, 1997, 1999; Zangl, 2008).
In the course of the almost two decades since the creation of the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism (DSM), judicial politics has gradually but inexorably
moved towards center stage. As this institutional innovation made the judicial
pathway towards trade liberalization, increasingly appealing to members of the
trade regime, the number of trade disputes increased dramatically (Weiler,
2001). While the vast majority of these disputes have not elicited compliance pro-
blems or signiﬁcant public attention (Busch and Reinhardt, 2000; Wilson, 2007;
Hudec, 1992), other disputes have been perceived to reach too deeply into practices
of domestic governance and have thus become highly politicized, causing heated
public debates at the domestic level and diplomatic tensions at the international
level (Davis, 2003). Also, the legislative and judicial arms of the WTO have
become increasingly intertwined as emerging economies have increasingly used liti-
gation as a tool to inﬂuence bargaining dynamics in the context of multilateral
trade negotiations, e.g. Doha Round. More generally, the decline of the WTO as
a forum for negotiated trade liberalization, epitomized by inability of the Doha
Round to achieve substantive trade liberalization commitments, is further increas-
ing the importance of the WTO’s judicial arm as a tool to maintain a liberal trade
regime. Altogether, these developments have made judicial politics the dominant
feature of the current multilateral trade regime and of international trade politics
at large.
Unsurprisingly, since 1995, the so-called politics of WTO dispute settlement has
been the subject of a rich and growing body of scholarly literature. These contri-
butions have explored various aspects of the phenomenon, signiﬁcantly contribut-
ing towards advancing our knowledge of the political-economic dynamics that
underlie the politics of dispute settlement in the WTO. However, we believe our
knowledge of judicial politics in international trade relations remains far from com-
prehensive. More speciﬁcally, we believe the almost exclusive focus of the existing
literature on the politics of WTO dispute settlement has led scholars to overlook a
number of issues that are key in order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of
judicial politics in international trade relations at large. With some exaggeration,
one might say that we know too much about too little. The aim of this special
issue is to contribute towards a broader understanding of judicial politics in inter-
national trade relations by addressing three broad questions: (1) the origins and
long-term effects of judicialization in the WTO, (2) the increasingly important
phenomenon of judicialization in the context of Preferential Trade Agreements
(PTAs), and (3) the relationship between judicial politics in the WTO and PTAs.
In this introduction, we further proceed in three steps. First, we deﬁne key con-
cepts and brieﬂy outline the state-of-the-art of the literature. Second, we identify a
number of research gaps. Third, we highlight in which ways the special issue con-
tributes to ﬁlling these gaps.
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Taking stock of judicial politics in international trade institutions
The reform of diplomatic GATT dispute settlement into the highly legalistic WTO
dispute settlement formalized in 1995, constituted the most prominent step towards
judicial institutions in the world trading regime. At the beginning of the eighties,
GATT contracting parties effectively abandoned the practice of vetoing GATT
panel rulings (Hudec, 1992). In 1989, GATT contracting parties formally abolished
the defendant’s veto against the establishment of a panel in a decision that took
immediate effect, independently from any further progress in the Uruguay Round
negotiations going on at the same time (GATT, 1990). In 1994, all future
members of theWTO approved of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that incor-
porated these two crucial changes, while adding yet two other crucial properties: the
possibility of appeal with an independent and permanentWTOAppellate Body, and
the possibility to haveWTO panels authorize cross-retaliation by the complainant in
cases of enduring non-compliance (WTO, 1995). By introducing the automatic right
to review, the formulation of legally binding obligations, a standing tribunal of jus-
tices, and the authority to authorize sanctions and even cross-retaliation against
recalcitrant members, GATT negotiators created one of the most legalized or judi-
cialized global institutions, enabling it to signiﬁcantly constrain the behavior of its
constituent members towards respecting commonly agreed-upon rules. This
process of institutional transformation has commonly been captured with the
term ‘legalization’ (Abbott et al., 2000; Goldstein et al., 2000; Bernauer et al.,
2014), or ‘judicialization’ (Zangl, 2008; Stone Sweet, 1997, 1999).
Both concepts denote an increased reliance on international law, yet can be used to
denote two distinct properties of this evolution. The term legalization is generally
used to cover the broad social phenomenon of an increase in the use of formal-
legal rules to regulate a particular domain, in casu trade. It captures an increase in
the degree of precision, obligation, and bindingness, as well as an increase in enforce-
ability through adjudication by an independent third party. The term judicialization
on the other hand refers more speciﬁcally to that latter aspect: the increase in enfor-
ceability through adjudication and the possible authorization of sanctions by an
independent third party. The term judicialization is thus a sub-set of the broader
concept of legalization, drawing attention to the presence of judicial institutions
that enhance the enforceability of previously agreed-upon rules in international
trade relations. The underlying assumption of our perspective is that precise, obliga-
tory, and binding agreed-upon rules need to be backed by credible enforcement
mechanisms for such rules to signiﬁcantly constrain the behavior of trade actors.
In light of the signiﬁcance, visibility, and far-reaching consequences of the reformof
themechanism of dispute settlement resolution of theWTO, it should come as no sur-
prise that the bulk of the literature on judicial politics in international trade relations
has so far focused on WTO dispute settlement. This literature has shed light on a
number of important aspects of the political-economy of WTO dispute settlement:
the determinants of dispute initiation (Bernauer and Sattler, 2011; Busch et al.,
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2009; Guzman and Simmons, 2005; Kim, 2008), the strategic behavior by dispute
settlement panels (Busch and Pelc, 2010; Garrett and Smith, 2002; Kelemen, 2001),
the choice of institutional venue for resolving trade disputes (Davis and Shirato,
2007; Busch, 2007), the reasons why disputes escalate (Busch, 2000; Davis, 2012;
Guzman and Simmons, 2002; Sattler and Bernauer, 2010), the affects of litigation
on the domestic balance of trade-related interest groups (Goldstein and Martin,
2000; Goldstein and Steinberg, 2008), and the conditions under which parties
comply with decisions adopted through third party review (Bown, 2004; Davis,
2008). More generally, existing research shows that the judicialization of the WTO
has brought about greater compliance with WTO rules (Zangl, 2008; Zangl et al.,
2011) and even acted as a buffer against protectionist policies being put into place
in the very ﬁrst place (Allee, 2005). Recent accounts of why the protectionist policies
have not erupted as a result of the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis further stress this last
point (Irwin and Mavroidis, 2008).
We certainly do not wish to argue that there is no further room for signiﬁcant con-
tributions in this important ﬁeld of inquiry. Important aspects of the politics ofWTO
dispute settlement certainly require further investigation. For instance, ﬁnding
appropriate ways of conducting large-N studies on compliance in WTO dispute
settlement remains problematic both because determining and measuring compli-
ance is inherently difﬁcult (it is private information to the litigating parties) and
because disentangling various potential causes for the policy change eventually
leading to compliance requires an in-depth knowledge of the cases (Mavroidis,
2012). Also, research on the dynamics underlying the appointment of judges in
WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body is still in its infancy (but
see Elsig and Pollack, 2014). More research would also be welcomed on the so-
called non-cases, namely how litigants select cases out of the total universe of poten-
tial cases (Bernauer et al., 2014).
Whilemore research on the politics ofWTOdispute settlement is certainly needed,
this brief overview bears witness of the richness of this literature. It seems fair to
argue that we know quite a lot about how WTO dispute settlement works.
Locating some gaps in the existing literature
In our view, there are a number of important things we need to know more about to
begin acquiring a comprehensive understanding of judicial politics in contemporary
international trade relations. While the politics of WTO dispute settlement is an
important component of this phenomenon, our knowledge of judicial politics in inter-
national trade relations at large remains far from comprehensive. First, broader ques-
tions and implications concerning the judicialization of the WTO have received
surprisingly little attention. Second, judicialization is by no means a phenomenon
restricted to multilateral trade relations. Indeed, the proliferation of preferential
trade agreements (PTAs) has gone hand in hand with a gradual increase in the
number of dispute settlement and enforcement provisions in these trade agreements.
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Finally, looking at the relationship between theWTO and PTAs from the perspective
of judicialization raises the question of the compatibility between the two.
The origins and long-term effects of judicialization in the WTO
As mentioned above, numerous studies have analyzed the politics of dispute settle-
ment in the WTO. However, two important questions have received surprisingly
little attention in the literature so far: why members of the trade regime designed
and committed to a quasi-judicial dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO,
and whether such judicialization of the WTO makes cooperation more likely in
the long-term.
First, it is somewhat puzzling to note how little research has been devoted to
explaining the extraordinary move to greater enforceability of commonly agreed-
upon rules represented by the creation of the WTO DSM. Surprisingly, it
remains somewhat of a theoretical riddle why such a judicialized institutional
mechanism was set up in the ﬁrst place. To be sure, some theoretically driven
accounts of why the WTO DSM was created have been put forward in the litera-
ture, yet they remain unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. For one, these studies
approach the problem from a functionalist perspective, explaining the creation of
the DSM with reference to the purposes it is supposed to fulﬁll, i.e. allowing for
efﬁcient breach of rules under conditions of uncertainty (Downs and Rocke,
1995; Rosendorff, 2005; Schwartz and Sykes, 2002), ﬁlling contractual gaps
betweenmembers of the regime (Horn et al., 2010), and enhancing credibility of com-
mitmentsby installing sanctioningdevices againstdefection (Pelc, 2010).Functionalist
accounts however, tend to employ research designs that merely establish that the
observedoutcome is consistentwith their predictions, thusonlyweakly linking the evi-
dence adduced to the underlying causal mechanisms (Thompson, 2010). Moreover,
this approach adopts a static view of actors’ preferences, neglecting how past and
new experiences, pre-existing institutional arrangements, and actors’ interactions
can affect those preferences and ultimately institutional design choices. In addition,
existing analyses suffer from a US bias, considering the motives of US policy makers
as sufﬁcient to explain this important international institutional process of reform,
and neglecting how other important trade actors, in particular the EU, might have
affected the negotiation processes leading to this particular design choice.
Second, as a result of the almost exclusive focus on the politics of dispute settlement
in the WTO, the existing literature has overlooked the less visible, but perhaps more
important, question whether judicialization makes WTO members more or less
likely to further cooperation in the WTO, either by deepening existing commitments
or by expanding theWTO’s reach to a host of new issue areas. The degree of enforce-
ability of prospective agreements is a key factor affecting the calculus actors make
when deciding to commit to such agreements (Downs and Rocke, 1995; Fearon,
1998; Koremenos et al., 2001). Judicialization in the WTO can thus be expected to
crucially affect the very prospects for cooperation in the international trade regime.
Yet, we still lack a systematic understanding and appreciation of whether
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judicialization hinders or strengthens theWTO capacity to foster cooperation in inter-
national trade relations. In a seminal article, Goldstein and Martin (2000) warned us
about the unintended effects of judicialization, suggesting that increased ‘bindingness’
of trade ruleswould likely decrease the propensity of trade-related domestic interests in
WTO members to support new multilateral trade agreements. Some studies have
sought to complement this analysis by showing that stronger enforcement of rules
increased the propensity of the European Union (EU) to engage constructively in the
Doha Round (De Bièvre, 2006; Poletti, 2011). More research is needed to cast light
on this important litigation–negotiation nexus in the trade regime (Bernauer et al.,
2014). For instance, journalists’ accounts, policy-oriented research, and even scholarly
studies on the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations concur in stressing the
‘shadow ofWTO law’, the threat or the actual use of litigation, was a key determinant
of policy preferences, bargaining strategies, and tactics of parties prior to and during
the Doha Round. To our knowledge however, no systematic and theoretically
informed study has yet been produced to investigate whether, under what conditions,
and how the decision by oneWTOmember to initiate a legal dispute against another
affects cooperative dynamics in the context of WTO negotiations.
Judicialization in PTAs
The relativeneglect of judicial politics in the context of PTAs standsout as an evenmore
surprising gap in the current literature. Research on the increasingly important
phenomenon of preferential trade agreements has increased dramatically in recent
years. The focus of these studies has been primarily on the causes of regionalism, its
trade liberalizing effects, and its relationship with the multilateral trading system
(Dür and Elsig, 2014). However, recent research has shown that one of the most strik-
ing features of the current wave of regionalism is the increasing presence of strong
enforcement mechanisms in PTAs (Dür et al., 2014). Allee and Elsig (2014), for
instance, show that 83% of around 600 existing PTAs include provisions on dispute
settlement, of which slightly less than half allow for some type of legal dispute settle-
ment, i.e. ad hoc arbitration, the use of a standing dispute settlement body, or
suggest the WTO or other outside dispute settlement mechanisms. Moreover, 99%
of PTAs that allow for legal dispute settlement include language that explicitly states
that tribunal decisions are binding and 65% have a sanctions provision that spells
out the rules governing how retaliation can be used to try and address non-compliance.
Despite the increasing importance of PTAs in current international trade
relations, research on both the causes of the ongoing move towards greater enfor-
ceability of rules in these agreements and its systematic effects on the degree of lib-
eralization of international trade remains scanty at best.
Dispute settlement design in regional PTAs was one of the ﬁrst aspects of PTAs to
be explored (McCall Smith, 2000). Yet, despite attempts to update this early study
(Jo and Namgung, 2012), our understanding of the causes driving judicialization in
PTAs remains limited for a number of reasons. First, these studies fail to include
measures that are key to capture the degree of enforceability of PTAs such as the
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presence of sanctions provisions. Second, existing large-N studies, similar to func-
tionalist accounts of WTO judicialization, do not engage in process tracing of
design choices. Finally, existing studies donot explicitly consider the important ques-
tion of over time design evolution. The overall process of increased judicialization of
PTAs is not only caused by the creation of new agreements with strong enforcement
mechanisms, this overall process is also driven by changes that render enforcement
mechanisms in already existing agreements stronger. Explaining the causes of
change towards greater enforceability in existing agreements is therefore also essen-
tial to acquire a comprehensive understanding of judicialization in PTAs.
It is also largely unclear whether the increasing judicialization of PTAs actually
matters for policy outcomes in terms of international trade liberalization. While the
literature has started to probe into questions like what determines whether dispute
settlement provisions in regional trade agreements are actually used (Gomez-Mera
and Molinari, 2014), other important questions remain. Does the judicialization of
PTAs foster trade ﬂows or not? What is the optimal degree of judicialization in
PTAs to foster trade liberalization? As almost half of world trade is nowadays con-
ducted under the aegis of PTAs and there is widespread consensus on the idea that
these are here to stay in the long-term, it is crucial to understand whether their
increased judicialization fosters or rather inhibits international trade ﬂows.
WTO and PTAS
Finally, crucial aspects of the relationship between theWTO and PTAs have remained
largely unexplored.Much of the debate on this topic has centered around the question
whether PTAs are building blocks or stumbling blocks for the multilateral trading
system (Baldwin, 1997; Dür, 2007). Scholars have also investigated the question of
the forum shopping behavior of states when litigation is an available strategy in both
the WTO and PTAs (Busch, 2007; Flett, 2014). However, looking at the relationship
between theWTOand the existing network of PTAs from the perspective of judicializa-
tion raises the perhaps more fundamental question of compatibility, i.e. how and why
the twohaveproved largely compatible so far. PTAswereoriginally conceived as excep-
tions to non-discriminatory trade under the WTO. Yet, we will soon be forced to con-
sider non-discriminatory trade to be the exception if the present wave of regionalism
continues at the current pace. Despite this trend, WTO members have not reacted in
ahostilemanner against PTAs andhave largely avoided to challenge themwith the judi-
cial tools at their disposal under the WTO. Understanding how and why PTAs have
proved compatible with judicial politics in the WTO is crucial given that PTAs are
likely to become the linchpin of future international trade cooperation as a result of
the decline of the WTO as a forum for negotiated trade liberalization.
Overview of the special issue
The contributions in this special issue start ﬁlling these important theoretical and
empirical gaps in the literature. The special issue is the end result of a two-day
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workshop at the Antwerp Centre for Institutions and Multilevel Politics (ACIM) at
the University of Antwerp on 27 and 28 May 2014.1
The contribution by Eckhardt and Elsig offers an analysis of the creation of the
WTO dispute settlement that shows how experiential learning affected the prefer-
ences and strategic choices of US and EU negotiators that ultimately led to the
creation of such institution. Their contribution highlights how the sparse existing
explanations for this design outcome have been unable to account for how the
context of experiences with the existing GATT dispute settlement rules and case
law, as well as templates, i.e. early design choices in the GATT and in other agree-
ments, signiﬁcantly shaped outcomes by affecting the expectations and positions of
key negotiators.
The contribution by Poletti, De Bièvre, and Chatagnier addresses the key ques-
tion of whether the judicialization of the WTO increased the odds of successful
cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. They develop a formal game theor-
etic explanation of the way in which the credible threat to resort to, and actual use
of, WTO litigation fostered state’s propensity to cooperative behavior in the Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The authors show that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, the shadow of increased enforcement does not necessarily
make actors shy away from further cooperation, but actually opens up a bargaining
window and ultimately increases the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade
negotiations, since the ability to impose costs on a defendant through litigation
increases the complainant’s bargaining power in such negotiations. They show
how this argument can account for how Brazil, a potential complainant, and the
EU and the US, two potential defendants, approached and bargained agricultural
negotiations in the Doha Round.
Two further contributions to the special issue deal with the phenomenon of judi-
cialization in PTAs. The contribution by Bezuijen seeks to uncover the determinants
of changes over time of third party dispute settlement provisions in regional trade
agreements. On the basis of a new dataset, which offers a reﬁned measure of third
party dispute settlement in regional trade organizations, the author considers the
role of three potential explanatory factors, i.e. differences in the relative power
of the members, the degree of trade interdependence between them, and the
degree of contract completeness. She explores the explanatory force of each of
these factors separately as well as when they occur jointly, and speculates about
further factors that can inﬂuence the further judicialization of existing arrange-
ments, as well as of cases where judicial institutions were wound down. She
ﬁnishes this case-sensitive comparative analysis with a case study of the reasons
1We gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Research Foundation Flanders (Fonds voor
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen, FWO), the special research fund of the University of
Antwerp (Bijzonder Onderzoeksfonds, BOF UA) and the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the
Universiteit Antwerpen. We would also like to thank Andreas Dür for comments on an earlier version
of this introductory article, as well as all the contributors to this special issue.
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for the abolishment of judicialized dispute settlement in the Latin American Free
Trade Association.
The contribution by Hicks and Kim offers a comprehensive assessment of the
variability of judicialization across PTAs and its impact on trade ﬂows. Based on
an original dataset of PTAs signed by countries in Asia, the authors show that
agreements where member states retain a great deal of discretion with regard to
their liberalization commitments are associated with an increase in intra-PTA
trade. Stronger enforcement through judicial institutions by contrast is negatively
associated with more trade. By distinguishing between the stringency of liberaliza-
tion commitments and the stringency of enforcement mechanisms in PTAs, and
testing on a reﬁned dataset, they signiﬁcantly advance the literature on ﬂexibility
in trade agreements in general and PTAs in particular.
The ﬁnal contribution by Mavroidis sheds light on the important question of
WTO-PTAs compatibility. He asks which actions are available to actors within
the WTO, and ﬁnds that neither the creation of new rules on PTAs – the legaliza-
tion option – nor increased litigation – the judicialization option – are desirable or
feasible against any reasonable benchmark. As the near absence of tariffs in the
current world trading system has greatly reduced the negative trade diversion
effects of PTAs, Mavroidis argues that the latter are primarily regulatory agree-
ments. As a result, negotiators would be well-advised to build bridges between
the WTO system and ongoing PTA negotiations by relying on transparent plurilat-
eral agreements that can gradually attract more members to accede to them, rather
than stubbornly sticking to single undertaking agreements.
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